Pakistan’s reported $4 billion arms agreement with Libya’s eastern-based forces is being marketed in Islamabad as a landmark achievement—its largest-ever weapons export and proof of its emergence as a so-called “net security provider.” Yet viewed through a security and geopolitical lens, the deal raises deeper questions about legality, intent and strategic consequence that extend far beyond commercial defence sales.
According to reporting by Reuters, the agreement was finalised under the direct supervision of **Asim Munir**, now elevated to field marshal, during meetings with representatives of the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar. The package reportedly includes JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft and Super Mushak trainers. On paper, this may look like routine defence diplomacy. In reality, it collides head-on with international law and destabilising regional dynamics.
---Advertisement---
At the core of the controversy lies Libya’s long-standing United Nations arms embargo on Libya, imposed after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi to prevent weapons flows from fuelling the country’s civil war. The LNA is not the internationally recognised government; it controls territory and oil infrastructure in eastern Libya but remains a non-state armed actor opposed to the UN-backed Tripoli authorities. Supplying combat aircraft to such an entity risks directly undermining the purpose of the embargo and prolonging a conflict that has already devastated Libyan society for over a decade.
---Advertisement---
Pakistan’s defence of the deal—that other countries engage with Benghazi, that Haftar himself is not individually sanctioned, and that Libya’s oil exports have improved ties with Western capitals—does little to address the central issue. International arms control regimes are not merely about individual sanctions lists; they are about preventing military escalation in fractured theatres. From that perspective, the transfer of combat aircraft is not a technical loophole but a strategic provocation.
The timing further complicates Islamabad’s narrative. Pakistan is currently navigating acute economic stress, reliant on IMF support and facing domestic instability. As Michael Kugelman of the Wilson Center has noted, a massive arms sale to a distant, divided country at such a moment inevitably raises eyebrows. The deal appears less a product of coherent export strategy and more an attempt by Pakistan’s military leadership to project strength abroad while consolidating authority at home.
This projection has been accompanied by increasingly ideological rhetoric. During his Africa and Middle East tour, Munir openly invoked religious language, urging Muslim nations to unite militarily and offering Pakistani arms and technology to “brothers” across the Islamic world. His remarks about being commanded to “strike terror in the hearts of enemies of Allah” blur the line between conventional defence diplomacy and ideological mobilisation. For a nuclear-armed state whose military has a long and troubled history of entanglement with extremist proxies, such language understandably alarms international observers.
From a regional security standpoint, the implications extend beyond North Africa. Arms exports are revenue streams, and in Pakistan’s case they directly strengthen an institution that has consistently prioritised military leverage over economic reform. From India’s perspective, this matters. The Pakistan Army’s posture along the Line of Control has hardened in recent years, particularly following the May clashes and India’s **Operation Sindoor**. Any significant inflow of defence revenue inevitably raises concerns about where surplus resources may be redeployed.
The Libya deal also fits into a broader pattern of Pakistan seeking legitimacy through military entrepreneurship rather than institutional reform. Munir’s assertion that Pakistan’s “recent war with India demonstrated our advanced capabilities” is telling. It reframes crisis escalation as a marketing tool, positioning conflict itself as proof of product credibility. That approach may attract buyers in unstable regions, but it undermines Pakistan’s claims of being a responsible security provider.
For Libya, the consequences could be severe. Introducing advanced aircraft into a fragmented battlespace risks shifting local power balances and encouraging renewed offensives rather than political compromise. Libya’s conflict has already become an arena for proxy competition involving regional and extra-regional actors. Pakistan’s entry as an arms supplier adds yet another external stakeholder with little incentive to prioritise de-escalation.
Ultimately, this deal is drawing scrutiny not because Pakistan seeks to export defence equipment—a legitimate ambition for any manufacturing state—but because of how, where and why it is doing so. Arms sales to non-state factions under UN embargo, wrapped in religious rhetoric and overseen personally by a powerful army chief, signal a model of security engagement that prioritises influence and optics over stability and law.
If Pakistan genuinely aspires to be seen as a net security provider, credibility will not come from headline-grabbing weapons contracts in war-torn states. It will come from adherence to international norms, restraint in rhetoric, and a demonstrable commitment to regional peace. On current evidence, the Libya deal points in the opposite direction—and that is precisely why the world is watching closely.
(Girish Linganna is an award-winning science communicator and a Defence, Aerospace & Geopolitical Analyst. He is the Managing Director of ADD Engineering Components India Pvt. Ltd., a subsidiary of ADD Engineering GmbH, Germany.)